

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 AF-08 ARA-06 CIAE-00

DODE-00 EA-07 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10

NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01 OES-06 SS-15

USIA-06 SAJ-01 EPA-01 CEQ-01 /125 W

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R 171515Z AUG 76

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1902

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: CCD, US, UR

SUBJECT: CCD: MARTIN CCD STATEMENT ON MDW

1. IN FORMAL CCD MEETING AUGUST 17, MARTIN PRESENTED
FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN:

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LAST WEEK THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATED IN ACTIVE AND

INTERESTING INFORMAL MEETINGS WITH EXPERTS ON THE QUESTION OF THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

THE PROPOSAL BY THE SOVIET UNION, INVOLVING A COMPREHENSIVE BAN, IS EMBODIED IN A DRAFT AGREEMENT SET OUT IN DOCUMENT NUMBER CCD/511. IT IS ELABORATED TO SOME EXTENT, PARTICULARLY AS TO DEFINITIONS, IN DOCUMENT NUMBER CCD/514.

THE SOVIET PROPOSAL RAISES MANY COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT QUESTIONS. IN LIGHT OF THE UNCERTAINTIES REMAINING TO BE RESOLVED OR CLARIFIED FURTHER, MANY OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE U.S. EXPERT IN THE INFORMAL MEETINGS WERE OF A PRELIMINARY CHARACTER.

IT IS THE LONG-STANDING PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONTRIBUTE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER TO TECHNICAL EXAMINATION OF A WIDE RANGE OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES IN THIS COMMITTEE. ENTRY INTO SUCH EXAMINATIONS HAS NOT NECESSARILY IMPLIED ENDORSEMENT OF ANY PARTICULAR PROPOSAL. THIS APPLIES TO THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET UNION.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT COME TO A POLICY DECISION REGARDING POSSIBLE TREATY PROHIBITIONS ON NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

WE ENTERED INTO THESE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF SEEKING CLARIFICATION OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN ORDER TO MOVE TOWARD AN INFORMED OPINION ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. THE FOUR DAYS OF DISCUSSION WERE INSTRUCTIVE TO THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION. WE NOTED A CONSIDERABLE RANGE OF TOPICS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN FURTHER STUDIES BEFORE WE FORMULATE OUR VIEWS.

THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THE DANGERS POSED BY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION -- NEW OR EXISTING -- AND IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARD OVERCOMING SUCH DANGERS. HOWEVER, EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT EXAMINATION OF DIVERSE NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WOULD REQUIRE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO QUESTIONS OF DEFINITION, SCOPE, AND VERIFICATION ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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THIS EXPERIENCE INTO ACCOUNT IN THE PROCESS OF JUDGING THE FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND OTHERS, HAVE RECOMMENDED CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF DEFINITION OF THE TERM "NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION." THIS, OF COURSE, IS AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE SUBJECT AT HAND, AND WE WOULD BE

PREPARED TO CONSIDER SUGGESTIONS FOR DEFINING THE TERM. WE RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS CAN BE RAISED ABOUT THE FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING A RIGOROUS DEFINITION THAT COULD SERVE AS A SOUND BASIS FOR FORMAL INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS. THERE WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT RISK THAT ANY FORMAL DEFINITION EITHER WOULD BE TOO GENERAL OR AMBIGUOUS TO BE APPLIED EFFECTIVELY TO INDIVIDUAL CASES OR WOULD BE SO SPECIFIC OR RIGID THAT UNFORESEEN SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS DESERVING TO BE COVERED WOULD BE UNINTENTIONALLY EXCLUDED. WE BELIEVE THESE CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND AS WE PROCEED ON THE QUESTION OF DEFINING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

THE TERM "WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION" HAS BEEN IN GENERAL INTERNATIONAL USAGE FOR ABOUT 30 YEARS. IT SEEMS CLEAR TO ME THAT THIS GENERAL USAGE PLACES NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN THE CATEGORY OF "WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION." THERE IS, OF COURSE, THE POTENTIALITY, IN PRINCIPLE, OF CREATING NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS WITH CHARACTERISTICS COMPARABLE TO THESE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED TYPES.

WE SHOULD TAKE CAREFUL NOTE OF THE FACT THAT IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN BROUGHT INTO FORCE TO IMPOSE LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. FURTHERMORE, THE PROCESS OF SEARCHING FOR FURTHER LIMITATIONS CONTINUES, INCLUDING SERIOUS CURRENT EFFORTS IN THE CCD.

THE UNITED STATES ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS APPLICABLE TO NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. WE ARE STRONGLY OF THE VIEW THAT DISCUSSIONS OF THE VERY BROAD PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD NOT IN ANY WAY, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, SUGGEST DILUTION OF THE INTEGRITY OR SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF EXISTING TREATIES OR NEGOTIATIONS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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CONCERNING WITH SPECIFIC KINDS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON ARMS LIMITATION OR DISARMAMENT SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATE MODERNIZATION IN LIGHT OF NEW SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS AND OTHER NEW FACTS. HOWEVER, MY GOVERNMENT WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT STATEMENTS THAT APPEAR UNJUSTIFIABLY TO CALL INTO QUESTION THE SCOPE OF ALREADY EXISTING AGREEMENTS. THESE STATEMENTS COULD BE VERY HARMFUL TO THE GENERAL CAUSE OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, BY CASTING UNWARRANTED DOUBT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH AGREEMENTS.

AS TO CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, I POINT TO INTENSIVE EFFORTS IN THE CCD AT THIS TIME ON A PROSPECTIVE CONVENTION CONCERNING ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION.

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 AF-08 ARA-06 CIAE-00

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USIA-06 SAJ-01 EPA-01 CEQ-01 /125 W

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R 171515Z AUG 76

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1903

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WE CAN ALSO TAKE NOTE OF CONTINUING AND ACTIVE DISCUSSIONS
OF LIMITATIONS ON CHEMICAL WARFARE.

AS TO AGREEMENTS ALREADY IN EXISTENCE, A PARTICULARLY
IMPORTANT EXAMPLE IS THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF
THE COMMITTEE TO SOME STATEMENTS MADE IN DECEMBER 1974, DURING
THE RATIFICATION PROCESS OF THE BW CONVENTION IN MY COUNTRY.
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE OF THE U.S. SENATE INQUIRED
WHETHER THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION WOULD PROHIBIT FUTURE

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TYPES OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE WHICH MIGHT EMPLOY TECHNIQUES BEYOND THE THEN CURRENT "STATE OF THE ART". THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESPONDED THAT:

"THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION WOULD PROHIBIT ANY FUTURE TYPE OF WARFARE WHICH EMPLOYED BIOLOGICAL AGENTS OR TOXINS, REGARDLESS OF WHEN THE AGENT WAS FIRST DEVELOPED OR DISCOVERED. THIS ALSO APPLIES TO WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT AND MEANS OF DELIVERY. IN OTHER WORDS, THE CONVENTION PROHIBITS NOT ONLY EXISTING MEANS OF BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WARFARE BUT ALSO ANY THAT MIGHT COME INTO EXISTENCE IN THE FUTURE."

PERMIT ME TO RECALL THAT ON AUGUST 5, 1970, THE DISTINGUISHED BIOLOGIST, DR. JOSHUA LEDERBERG, POINTED OUT TO THE CCD THE ADVANCES BEING MADE IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY AND EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT NEWLY DEVELOPED TECHNIQUES IN THIS FIELD MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE USED TO CREATE INFECTIVE AGENTS AGAINST WHICH NO CREDIBLE DEFENSE IS POSSIBLE. THE MOST WIDELY-DISCUSSED TECHNIQUES ARE OFTEN REFERRED TO AS "GENETIC ENGINEERING" BUT TECHNICALLY ARE PROPERLY KNOWN AS "RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNIQUES". THESE ARE TECHNIQUES FOR JOINING TWO DIFFERENT PIECES OF DNA IN THE LABORATORY TO PRODUCE NEW DNA SEQUENCES, KNOWN AS RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES. IN PRINCIPLE, SUCH TECHNIQUES COULD BE USED TO DESIGN RADICALLY NEW VIRUSES FOR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PURPOSES.

WHEN ADVANCES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ARE MADE, IT IS NATURAL TO ASK ABOUT THEIR POSSIBLE USE FOR HOSTILE PURPOSES AND TO INQUIRE WHETHER OR NOT SUCH USES ARE PROHIBITED OR RESTRICTED BY EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. IN THE CASE OF POTENTIAL USE OF RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES IT IS OUR VIEW THAT SUCH USE CLEARLY FALLS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION'S PROHIBITION. THIS INTERPRETATION IS BASED UPON THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY AS WELL AS THE EXPLICIT LANGUAGE OF THE CONVENTION, AND WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS SHARED BY THE OTHER SIGNATORIES.

I DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS POSSIBLE TO READ THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND COME TO ANY OTHER CONCLUSIONS. THE PREAMBLE STATES THAT THE STATES PARTIES ARE "DETERMINED, FOR LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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THE SAKE OF ALL MANKIND, TO EXCLUDE COMPLETELY THE POSSIBILITY

OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AGENTS AND TOXINS BEING USED AS WEAPONS." THE INTENT OF ARTICLE I WHICH BEGINS, "EACH STATE PARTY TO THIS CONVENTION UNDERTAKES NEVER IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES . . ." IS EQUALLY FORCEFUL AND CLEAR. TO TAKE A MORE RESTRICTED VIEW OF THE CONVENTION'S SCOPE WOULD ROB THE CONVENTION OF MUCH OF ITS VALUE AND COULD EVEN LEAD STATES TO CALL INTO QUESTION ITS CONTINUED VIABILITY.

THESE WERE THE VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES WHEN THE CONVENTION WAS NEGOTIATED AND RATIFIED. THEY ARE STILL ITS VIEWS TODAY. THIS A MATTER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO MY GOVERNMENT AND ONE ON WHICH DOUBT CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO EXIST.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THE UNITED STATES TOOK NOTE OF MANY SIGNIFICANT POINTS RAISED BY VARIOUS DELEGATIONS IN THE INFORMAL MEETINGS. WE WILL GIVE ALL OF THEM CAREFUL STUDY.

IN CONCLUSION, MR. CHAIRMAN, I MUST REPEAT THAT THE PROPOSAL OF THE USSR PRESENTS US WITH A VERY COMPLEX SUBJECT. THE SUBJECT IS NOT ONLY COMPLEX. IT ALSO REMAINS CONCEPTUALLY ELUSIVE BECAUSE IT HAS NOT YET BEEN PLACED ON A STABLE FOUNDATION OF CLEAR AND GENERALLY ACCEPTED UNDERSTANDINGS.

ANY EFFORTS TOWARD FURTHER DEVELOPMENT MUST STRIVE TO ESTABLISH SUCH A FOUNDATION AND, AT THE SAME TIME, ASSURE A HARMONIOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS. WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THESE COMPLEMENTARY REQUIREMENTS, THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO VIEW THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET UNION AS AN INITIATIVE TO BE GIVEN CAREFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICAL ATTENTION.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, SPEECHES, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, MDW, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 17 AUG 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: BoyleJA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976GENEVA06582
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760315-0864
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760847/aaaabouu.tel
Line Count: 309
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: BoyleJA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 17 NOV 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <17 NOV 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <03 AUG 2004 by BoyleJA>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CCD: MARTIN CCD STATEMENT ON MDW
TAGS: PARM, US, UR, CCD
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006